When in Rome: ensuring commonhold works in the real world

Drawing on Italy’s Condominio model, this piece examines the less visible but essential mechanisms that keep shared buildings functioning when things go wrong, and what this means for the future of commonhold in England.

Even the most carefully designed governance framework depends on effective enforcement. In shared buildings, this usually means enforcing payment of contributions, compliance with building rules and decisions taken collectively by owners.

Italian condominium law is explicit on this point; the Condominio is treated as a legal entity with enforceable rights against individual owners. Where an owner fails to pay their service charges, the Amministratore di Condominio is legally empowered (and in practice expected) to pursue recovery. This can include formal payment demands, court proceedings and ultimately enforcement against the property itself. 

Crucially, enforcement is not left to other owners acting informally against a neighbour. It is the administrator, acting under statutory authority, who initiates and manages the process. This reduces the risk that disagreements escalate into personal conflict and ensures that the building’s financial position is protected regardless of individual relationships. By contrast, enforcement within English commonhold is more ambiguous. While commonhold associations will have powers to collect contributions, the practical burden of enforcement is likely to fall on volunteer directors or fellow owners unless professional management is in place.

One of the risks in commonhold is that enforcement becomes personal. When owners have to chase their neighbours for money, problems are delayed, avoided or handled inconsistently, and buildings pay the price.

Italy’s system is also pragmatic about owner engagement. Attendance at meetings varies, participation fluctuates and not every owner is invested in day‑to‑day decision‑making, and the legal framework is designed to accommodate this reality.  Quorum rules allow meetings to proceed even when turnout is low, with thresholds adjusting between first and second calls. Decisions, once properly taken, are binding on all owners, including those who did not attend or voted against them. The emphasis is on continuity and implementability rather than consensus at all costs.This design reduces pressure on individual owners and recognises that engagement ebbs and flows over time.

The proposed commonhold framework places greater emphasis on active participation, particularly where management and governance depend on owner‑directors. While this may work in smaller or highly motivated groups, it is less certain at scale. High turnover, overseas ownership and investor‑owned units all reduce the likelihood of sustained engagement.

A system that assumes consistent participation risks failure under ordinary conditions. Italy’s experience suggests that engagement should be encouraged, but never treated as the only thing standing between order and dysfunction.

Because payment enforcement is expected, buildings are better able to plan for maintenance and major works. This reduces the temptation to defer essential repairs, which is one of the most common causes of deterioration in under‑managed developments.

Under commonhold, long‑term funding mechanisms exist but are more discretionary. Reserve funds may be created, but their adequacy will depend heavily on owner agreement and governance maturity. Where contributions are politically difficult to raise, under‑funding becomes a structural risk.

For lenders and purchasers, predictability matters. The Italian model provides a familiar and durable framework in which financial obligations are both clear and enforceable. Commonhold will need to demonstrate equivalent resilience if it is to inspire market confidence.

Taken together, enforcement, engagement and financial structure underline a broader point. Sustainable shared ownership depends less on ideal behaviour and more on systems designed for an imperfect reality. Italy’s Condominio model does not eliminate conflict, apathy or disagreement. Instead, it acknowledges that these are inevitable and builds governance structures capable of absorbing them without collapse.

English commonhold represents an essential reform, particularly as an alternative to leasehold - but if it is to succeed beyond principle and pilot schemes, it must be built to withstand everyday pressures.