When in Rome: what Italy’s Condominio model tells us about governance

By examining how Italian law anticipates disengagement, dispute and change, they explore what this reveals about the practical challenges facing England’s proposed commonhold model.

In the first article in this series, we looked at how Italy’s Condominio system demonstrates that apartment ownership can thrive without leaseholders or freeholders. But permanent ownership alone does not keep a building running. Day‑to‑day reality is shaped just as much by governance, decision‑making and management.

This is where the Italian experience offers some of its most useful lessons, and where the proposed English commonhold framework is likely to face its toughest practical tests.

In Italy, collective ownership is underpinned by a structured governance model that assumes two things from the outset: that not all owners will be equally engaged, and that disputes are inevitable. The law is designed accordingly.

Most apartment buildings are managed by an independent Amministratore di Condominio. Appointment becomes mandatory where a building has more than eight owners, reflecting a legal recognition that self‑management has limits. The administrator is responsible for convening owners’ meetings, collecting contributions, managing accounts, enforcing the building’s regulations and representing the Condominio legally.

Importantly, the administrator does not displace owner control. Strategic decisions still rest with the owners collectively. But the administrator provides continuity, technical competence and procedural discipline, ensuring that the building continues to function even when participation fluctuates.

Decision‑making itself is also structured with realism in mind. Owners are invited to general and extraordinary meetings, and voting thresholds vary depending on the nature of the decision. Voting weight is linked to each owner’s share in the building, measured through the millesimi system, aligning influence with financial responsibility.

This framework does not eliminate disagreement, but it reduces uncertainty. Clear thresholds, prescribed procedures and professional oversight help prevent deadlock and personal conflict from paralysing the building’s operation.

By contrast, the English commonhold proposals place far greater emphasis on owner self‑governance. Although commonhold associations will be able to appoint managing agents, there is no mandatory requirement to do so. Management may fall instead to volunteer directors, often drawn from among the unit owners themselves.

This approach mirrors existing share‑of‑freehold arrangements in England and Wales, where outcomes are mixed at best. While some buildings operate smoothly, many rely heavily on a small number of committed individuals. Over time, responsibility concentrates, disputes become personal and essential governance tasks can be neglected.

The issue is not that commonhold owners are unwilling to manage their buildings, but that governance structures must work under ordinary conditions including apathy, turnover and disagreement. Systems that rely too heavily on voluntary engagement risk undermining confidence, particularly in larger or more complex developments.

Flexibility is another area where governance design matters. The proposed Commonhold Community Statement will contain mandatory provisions, but local rules may be amended with the agreement of 75% of members. Some adaptability is necessary, but frequent or substantive rule changes can introduce uncertainty for purchasers and lenders assessing long‑term risk.

Italy’s Condominio system again illustrates a different balance. Core governance principles are fixed in statute and cannot be altered locally. While individual buildings can tailor aspects of their regulations, the underlying structure remains consistent and predictable.

If commonhold is to succeed at scale in England, governance will need to be treated as an essential part of the tenure and not an optional add‑on. Ownership reform may remove longstanding injustices, but without robust, realistic governance structures, commonhold risks inheriting new problems of its own.

In the final article in this series, we turn to enforcement, engagement and financial resilience and examine what must be in place to ensure that commonhold works not just in theory, but in the everyday life of residential buildings.